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WHEN OPTING OUT IS THE ONLY OPTION: 
PROTECTING SMALL BUSINESS DEBTORS 
IN BANKRUPTCY 
ABSTRACT 
This Note implores states that have not already done so to opt out of 
the provisions of the Federal Bankruptcy Code that place explicit limits on 
the amount a debtor is allowed to exempt from liquidation. By doing so, 
states will be able to provide debtors who operate their own small business 
a greater degree of protection from creditors, as those states are entitled 
to establish their own limit on the value of the tools of a debtor’s trade the 
debtor may shield in bankruptcy. This Note contends that Congress has 
evinced an intent within the last decade to restrict the ability of small busi-
ness debtors to exempt the value of their assets and that federal judges have 
shown unwillingness to allow states to provide debtors with a choice be-
tween federal exemption limits and state exemption limits. Consequently, it 
is incumbent upon states to expressly opt out of the relevant portions of the 
Bankruptcy Code to provide their small business debtors the more generous 
slate of exemption laws that the evidence suggests these states intended to 
provide in the first instance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Federal law allows a bankrupt debtor to exempt much, and in many in-
stances most, of the debtor’s personal property from the bankruptcy es-
tate.1 These protections may aid the debtor significantly, as “[t]he concept, 
scope, and definition of ‘property of the estate’ are broadly construed and 
applied.”2 Many states afford debtors, bankrupt and non-bankrupt alike, 
the option to exempt property under state law.3 This means that the debtor 
may not be compelled to liquidate exempt property.4 The rationale behind 
this policy is straightforward. Lawmakers have concluded that retaining an 
interest in essential items will better provide the debtor with a “fresh start” 
after bankruptcy.5 States and the federal government reach different con-
clusions as to just how fresh that start should be. 
This Note examines how the manner in which Congress, state legisla-
tures, bankruptcy courts, and appellate courts address the friction between 
state and federal exemption laws may impact small business owners who 
seek bankruptcy protection. To illustrate this dynamic, this Note will con-
sider debtors seeking to invoke the “tools-of-the-trade” exemptions availa-
ble under the federal Bankruptcy Code and various state laws. That exami-
nation yields the conclusion that it is incumbent on states either to opt out of 
the federal exemption scheme or to provide their debtors with a more gen-
erous array of exemption laws. This is because the Bankruptcy Abuse Pre-
vention and Consumer Protection Act of 20056 and a recent ruling by the 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit7 are emblematic of a legal 
                                                 
1 See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2006) for the complete list of exemptions and their potential 
“value.” Section 522(a)(2) defines “value” as “[the] fair market value as of the date of the 
filing of the petition [for bankruptcy] or with respect to property that becomes property of 
the estate after such date, as of the date such property becomes property of the estate.” 
2 3A BANKRUPTCY SERVICE LAWYERS EDITION § 29:24 (Oct. 2011). 
3 In re Sainlar, 344 B.R. 669, 672 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) (noting that most states 
provide their own exemptions); Elijah M. Alper, Opportunistic Informal Bankruptcy: 
How BAPCPA May Fail to Make Wealthy Debtors Pay Up, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 
1916 (2007) (“Importantly, state exemption laws apply to any money judgment, in or 
outside the bankruptcy context. An individual uses the same exemptions when filing for 
bankruptcy as she would use to protect assets from a tort judgment or collection agency.” 
(internal citation omitted)). 
4 In re Ruppel, 368 B.R. 42, 43 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007). 
5 Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets 
on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 235 
(1995); see also In re Willis, 189 B.R. 203, 205 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1995), rev’d, 197 
B.R. 912 (N.D. Okla. 1996) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595 (1977)) (stating that “Congress 
has called the ‘fresh start,’ ‘the essence of modern bankruptcy law.’”). 
6 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
7 In re Schafer, 455 B.R. 590 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2011). 
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environment that is increasingly hostile to debtors. Given that in 2009 a 
whopping 1.41 million Americans filed for personal bankruptcy,8 the impli-
cations of federal dominance over this issue are more expansive than they 
once were. 
The ostensible rationale for offering debtors a choice between federal 
exemptions and state exemptions is to combat such hostility, but many 
states’ exemption laws fail to advance that purpose meaningfully. What is 
more, because the Supreme Court is unlikely to ameliorate this trend in the 
foreseeable future, states should act on this proposition quickly and opt out 
of the Bankruptcy Code if they have not yet done so. This will better pro-
vide debtors with the “fresh start” that our bankruptcy framework is pur-
ported to promote. 
The language of the Bankruptcy Code strongly suggests that a debtor is 
bound to rely on the federal exemptions outlined in the Code if that debtor’s 
state has not expressly opted out of it.9 Under the federal Bankruptcy Code, 
a debtor may exempt up to $146,450 of the value of his or her homestead.10 
State homestead exemption laws, meanwhile, vary widely. Massachusetts, 
for example, offers its debtors a $500,000 homestead exemption.11 Minne-
sota’s homestead exemption is $300,000, but that amount rises to $750,000 
if the land is used for agricultural purposes.12 Florida simply imposes no 
absolute dollar value limit on a homestead exemption.13 One may wonder 
how this can be, given that Congress has established a clear-cut figure.14 
Congress has been equally clear in its deference, allowing states to establish 
their own exemption parameters as long as the state expressly opts out of 
the federal scheme.15 
                                                 
8 Sara Murray & Conor Dougherty, Personal Bankruptcy Filings Rising Fast, WALL ST. 
J. (Jan. 7, 2010, 12:14 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126263231055415303.html. 
9 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) (2006) (“Property listed in this paragraph is property that is 
specified under subsection (d), unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under 
paragraph (3)(A) specifically does not so authorize.”). 
10 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1). The footnote to that provision states that the value of the exemp-
tion is to be “adjusted by the Judicial Conference of the United States. See Adjustment of 
Dollar Amounts notes set out under this section and 11 U.S.C. § 104.” Id. 
11 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 1 (2011). If the homestead is owned by joint tenants or 
tenants by the entirety, however, “the declared homestead exemption shall remain whole 
and unallocated, provided that the owners together shall not be entitled to a declared 
homestead exemption in excess of $500,000.” Id. 
12 MINN. STAT. § 510.02 (2007). 
13 FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4. Florida does limit the amount of land a debtor may exempt, 
however, in that only “a homestead, if located outside a municipality, to the extent of one 
hundred sixty acres of contiguous land and improvements thereon” may qualify for the 
unlimited monetary exemption. Id. 
14 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1). 
15 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2). 
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For at least one court recently, Michigan’s homestead law did not opt 
out expressly enough. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (B.A.P.) for the 
Sixth Circuit, in the case of In re Schafer,16 held that Michigan could not 
enact exemption legislation that applied only to bankrupt Michigan debt-
ors.17 The statute that the B.A.P. invalidated in that case stated that a “debt-
or in bankruptcy under the bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1330, may 
exempt from property of the estate property that is exempt under federal law 
or, under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2), the following property.”18 In other words, 
Michigan debtors were given a choice between invoking Michigan exemp-
tion law or federal exemption law.19 Such a balancing act is not uncommon. 
In Minnesota, for example, “[d]ebtors filing a bankruptcy petition ... 
may elect between the federal homestead exemptions in the Bankruptcy 
Code, or elect the homestead exemptions provided by Minnesota law, plus 
any federal exemptions, other than the homestead exemptions.”20 Congress 
recently lent sanction to this arrangement, as the opt-out provision was un-
affected by the sweeping Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Pro-
tection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).21 
Holding that Michigan’s strain of statutory inclusiveness violated the 
Constitution’s Bankruptcy Clause, the Sixth Circuit B.A.P. struck it down.22 
Its reasons and the soundness of those reasons are largely immaterial to this 
Note and, for all intents and purposes, to small business debtors. Far more 
germane to those debtors are the far-ranging effects of the legal environ-
ment that decision embodied, rather than its constitutional underpinnings, 
because many debtors may face disastrous consequences unless their state 
legislators take swift action. 
I. TOOLS-OF-THE-TRADE 
As is true with respect to a debtor’s homestead, the Bankruptcy Code al-
lows a debtor to exempt “$2,175 in value, in any implements, professional 
                                                 
16 455 B.R. 590 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2011). 
17 Id. at 601 (“A state exemption statute which applies only to state residents who file 
for bankruptcy violates the Bankruptcy Clause.”). 
18 Id. at 598 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5451 (2011)). 
19 It should be noted that this choice seems to be an obvious one, as Michigan’s homestead 
exemption stands at a relatively meager $3500. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6027 (2011). 
20 2E BANKRUPTCY SERVICE, LAWYERS EDITION § 26:135 (Oct. 2011) (citing 11 U.S.C. 
§ 522(d); MINN. STAT. § 510.02 (2007); In re Ladd, 450 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
21 David A. Samole & Lisa B. Keyfetz, New Law, New Tools for Creditors A Fresh Look 
at the Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 17, 18 (“Debtors 
in bankruptcy can still choose their state’s exemptions (again, if the state of residency makes 
such choice available).”). 
22 In re Schafer, 455 B.R. at 607. 
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books, or tools of the trade of the debtor.”23 As is also true with respect to a 
debtor’s homestead, many states had a slightly different idea. Wyoming’s 
tools-of-the-trade exemption stands at $4000.24 Although bankrupt Rhode 
Islanders may expect to keep $1500 worth of tools,25 Louisiana places no 
monetary cap on the tools-of-the-trade exemption.26 In most jurisdictions, a 
debtor may claim only one occupation for which to exempt his or her tools.27 
The significance of the variance between states, however, pales in com-
parison to the significance within those states. Michigan provides debtors in 
bankruptcy a $2000 exemption for “tools, implements, materials, stock, ap-
paratus, or other things to enable a person to carry on the profession, trade, 
occupation, or business in which the person is principally engaged.”28 For 
debtors who have not declared bankruptcy, however, that exemption 
amounts to $1000.29 Clearly, then, Michigan draws the same distinctions 
between its debtors claiming tools-of-the-trade exemptions that the Sixth 
Circuit B.A.P. found unconstitutional when it considered Michigan’s home-
stead exemption statute,30 and indeed the very same statute codified each set 
of exemptions.31 
So why is this a problem for debtors? After all, the federal exemption 
scheme, which Michigan allowed its debtors to invoke if they so chose,32 fea-
tured a higher claim limit for homesteads33 and for tools-of-the-trade.34 The 
                                                 
23 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6) (2006). 
24 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-20-106 (2011); In re Bechtoldt, 210 B.R. 599, 601 (B.A.P. 10th 
Cir. 1997). 
25 Rhode Island exempts $1500. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-26-4 (2006). 
26 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881 (2010). Louisiana does require that the tools be 
“necessary to the exercise of a trade, calling, or profession by which [the debtor] earns 
his livelihood.” Id. 
27 See, e.g., In re Meckfessel, 67 B.R. 277, 278 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986); In re Cordova, 
394 B.R. 389 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008). In some instances, a debtor may invoke a tools-of-
the-trade exemption even if his or her claimed trade is not his or her principal occupation. 
See In re Thompson, 311 B.R. 822, 826 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2004) (stating that “even if 
[raising game birds] were not the debtors’ principal trade or business, this Court would 
still be inclined to allow the exemption”). 
28 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.545(i) (2011). 
29 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6023 allows a debtor to exempt “[t]he tools, implements 
materials, stock, apparatus, team, vehicle, motor vehicle, horses, harness, or other things 
to enable a person to carry on the profession, trade, occupation, or business in which the 
person is principally engaged.” 
30 See In re Schafer, 455 B.R. 590, 601 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2011), noting that differentia-
tion between debtors in bankruptcy and those debtors who have not filed for bankruptcy 
is unconstitutional. 
31 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) (2006); 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6)(2006). 
32 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2). 
33 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1) (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6027. 
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problem for a debtor is that if the debtor chooses one federal exemption, he or 
she must opt for them across the board.35 Without the ability to mix and 
match exemption laws, a debtor would have to comprehensively assess which 
set of exemptions would net him, or her, the greatest degree of protection. 
II. SMALL BUSINESS DEBTORS AFTER BAPCPA 
Congress ostensibly enacted the BAPCPA “to discourage egregious 
pre-bankruptcy exemption planning, including closing that ‘mansion loop-
hole’ that exists when debtors, in contemplation of filing bankruptcy, pur-
chase homes with heavy price tags in states that have unlimited homestead 
exemption laws.”36 One would be hard-pressed to take umbrage with this 
objective,37 yet the effects of BAPCPA extend well beyond reducing crafty 
real estate transactions. 
BAPCPA impacts small business debtors in a litany of ways. The 2005 
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code define a “small business debtor” as “a 
person engaged in commercial or business activities with total noncontin-
gent, liquidated secured and unsecured debts of not more than $2 million.”38 
Like the rest of BAPCPA, the provisions impacting small business debtors 
are particularly friendly to creditors and provide for “eight new grounds for 
dismissal or conversion.”39 Not surprisingly, when considered in conjunction 
                                                                                                                         
34 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.545(i). 
35 William L. Norton, Jr., Debtors’ Exemption Choices, Generally (Code § 522(b)), 3 
NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 56:3 (3d ed. Oct. 2011); 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) 
(stating that “[p]roperty listed in this paragraph is property that is specified under subsection 
(d), unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (3)(A) specifically 
does not so authorize”). 
36 American Bankruptcy Institute 15th Annual Northeast Bankruptcy Conference, BAPCPA 
Three Years Later: Through the Looking Glass—How Is It Down the Rabbit Hole?, 071008 
ABI-CLE 967 (July 10, 2008) [hereinafter ABI Bankruptcy Conference Report]. 
37 Closing the “mansion loophole” was likely not the only reason Congress decided to act. 
David M. Holliday, Annotation, Construction and Application of Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act’s (BAPCPA) Limitation of Homestead Exemption, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 522(p), 52 A.L.R. FED. 2D 541 (2011). The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of 
Texas argues as much by looking to the language of 11 U.S.C. § 522 (p), which exempts “any 
amount of interest acquired by the debtor during the 1215-day period preceding the date of 
filing of the petition that exceeds in the aggregate $146,450.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(p), cited in In 
re Presto, 376 B.R. 554, 585, 586 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007). 
38 William L. Norton III & Randolph J. Haines, Business Bankruptcy Aspects of the 2005 
Amendments, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Aug. 2005, at 2. 
39 Id. These grounds, according to the Amended Sections 1112(b) and 1104(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, include “failure to maintain appropriate insurance that poses a risk to the 
estate or the public[,] ... failure to attend § 341 meeting [which allows debtors to solicit 
votes for plan approval] or any Rule 2004 examination[, and] ... failure to pay any taxes due 
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with other substantive and procedural changes to the Code, a Chapter 11 
debtor’s need to convert his or her case into a Chapter 13 appears more like-
ly than before.40 
Furthermore, the law potentially makes it more difficult for an indi-
vidual Chapter 11 debtor to reorganize,41 which a debtor who owns a 
small business has been able to do for the last twenty years.42 BAPCPA 
also imposes limits on the extensions most debtors may obtain to file a 
plan.43 In the wake of BAPCPA, bankruptcy courts have rigidly enforced 
the law’s requirement that a debtor must submit all required paperwork 
within forty-five days.44 Expedited deadlines appear to be somewhat of a 
recurring theme throughout the legislation. BAPCPA ballooned the former 
ten-day period in which a supplier could demand the reclaimed good from 
the debtor before the debtor filed for bankruptcy four-and-one-half fold to 
forty-five days.45 To the extent that a debtor would be able to claim any of 
these items as tools-of-the-trade in the first instance, the debtor would now 
have to convert to a Chapter 13 and expend the exemption limit to retain 
them.46 Moreover, under BAPCPA, income that a debtor earns after filing 
                                                                                                                         
postpetition.” Id. Generally, in small business cases “[a] debtor’s obligation is to confirm 
the reorganization plan in accordance with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(e) and 1121(e). If a debtor 
cannot comply, the case is then subject to a conversion.” Gregory R. Schaaf, Small Business 
Cases Develop Some Teeth, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec.–Jan. 2011, at 46, 47. 
40 A debtor who owns a small business is entitled to file for Chapter 11 reorganization in-
dividually as well. See, e.g., In re Steedley, 09-50654, 2010 WL 3528599 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 
Aug. 27, 2010). An individual’s right to file for Chapter 11 reorganization, even if the debtor’s 
business is not ongoing, stems from Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991). The Court’s 
ruling in Toibb may lend considerable relief to a debtor who finds himself in a similar sit-
uation to the debtor in In re Ferro, 2010 WL 310857 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010) (where deb-
tor had not engaged in the business of manufacturing boat molds for a number of years). 
41 See, e.g., William L. Norton, Jr., Additional Duties Imposed by the 2005 Amendments, 5 
NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE § 55:2 (3d ed. Oct. 2012) (“Code § 521(b) requires 
every debtor, who is an individual, to file, at the time that the case is commenced, a certificate 
issued by an approved budget and credit counseling agency (‘credit counseling agency’) 
stating the services rendered to the debtor.”) (footnotes omitted). 
42 Toibb, 501 U.S. at 161. 
43 See Shirley S. Cho, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy After BAPCPA—A Closer Look at: Crit-
ical Trade; Exclusivity; and Dismissal/Conversion, 63 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 79, 80 
(2009) (noting further that “different deadlines and rules apply if the debtor is a ‘small busi-
ness,’ or one whose aggregate noncontingent liquidated secured and secured debts do not 
exceed $2,000,000”). Such rules are spelled out in 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e) (2006) and do not 
include a twenty-month extension ceiling. 
44 See 11 U.S.C. § 521 (2006); In re Ott, 343 B.R. 264, 267 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006); In 
re Fawson, 338 B.R. 505, 509 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006). 
45 Norton & Haines, supra note 38 (citing Amended Code Sections §§ 546(c), 503(b)). 
46 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2010). 
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for bankruptcy is considered property of the estate, and this was not previ-
ously the case.47 Also significant to debtors is BAPCPA’s requirement that 
an individual seeking Chapter 11 reorganization must make all payments 
before having his or her case discharged.48 After In re Schafer, this may 
present debtors with a problem. Chapter 11 debtors are within their rights to 
convert their cases to Chapter 7 if their plan proves to be infeasible.49 This 
would suggest that, at least in the Sixth Circuit, In re Schafer would then 
control, as In re Schafer was also a Chapter 7 case.50 Thus, pursuant to In re 
Schafer, many debtors formerly seeking Chapter 11 reorganization may likely 
find themselves beholden to a more rigid slate of exemption laws.51 
A recent case before the Eastern Division of Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of Ohio encapsulates some of the causes and the effects 
of the BAPCPA. In that case, Ohio debtors had “continuously transitioned 
between Ohio and Florida, and for the 180-day period preceding the 730-
day period prior to the Petition Date, Debtors were domiciled in Flori-
da.”52 This factual scenario directly implicated the BAPCPA amendment 
that if a debtor had lived in multiple states throughout the two year period 
before filing, the state exemption law that controls is of the state “in which 
the debtor’s domicile was located for 180 days immediately preceding the 
730-day period or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any 
other place.”53 Because the statutory language does not distinguish home-
stead exemptions from other exemptions, the court’s reasoning would almost 
certainly apply to tools-of-the-trade exemptions. Incidentally, that ruling was 
                                                 
47 Robert J. Landry III, Individual Chapter 11 Cases After BAPCPA: Can You Still 
Close the Case Early?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July–Aug. 2006, at 10. This change seems 
to run counter to the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, which stipulates 
that most actions that could have been initiated against the debtor before he or she filed 
are no longer eligible for initiation. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006). Indeed, 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) 
states that a bankruptcy estate comprises all of a debtor’s assets as of the filing date, and 
that exemptions are then subtracted. For more on how the BAPCPA impacted the 
Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provisions, see Stuart Larsen, New Semi-Automatic 
Stay One Year After BAPCPA, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2007. 
48 Landry, supra note 47, at 60. 
49 Erin J. Koffman, What Is Bad Faith Conversion? The Need for a Uniform Method 
of Determination, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 425, 431 (2001) (“The Code provides a debtor with 
the right to convert a filing under chapter 7 to a filing under chapters 11, 12 or 13 if such 
debtor has not previously converted the case from one of those chapters to chapter 7.”) 
(citing 11 U.S.C. § 706(a) (2006)). 
50 In re Schafer, 455 B.R. 590, 593 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2011) (“On August 7, 2009, Dorothy 
Ann Jones (‘Jones’) filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
51 Id. at 601. 
52 In re Beckwith, 448 B.R. 757, 760 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2011). 
53 Id. at 761 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) (2006)). 
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that “a debtor who resides in Ohio but who is forced into using a Florida 
exemption pursuant to § 522(b)(3)(A) may elect federal exemptions listed in 
§ 522(d). Debtors may not claim Florida exemptions because they were not 
Florida residents.”54 Thus, small business debtors must pay particular atten-
tion to which state law will bind them, as BAPCPA has altered the process 
by which this is determined. 
III. WHAT ARE TOOLS-OF-THE-TRADE TO SMALL BUSINESS DEBTORS? 
Many statutes provide little, if any, explanation as to what a “tool-of-the-
trade” actually is.55 Recently, two approaches have emerged to define the 
term. The first of these can be deemed the “function” or “utilitarian pur-
pose” test, which “permits exemption of items reasonably necessary, both in 
kind and quality, for a worker to perform the chosen occupation efficiently 
and competently.”56 In one case adopting this particular approach, the Rhode 
Island Bankruptcy Court held that a piano was reasonably necessary for the 
debtor to conduct his trade, which was to provide “lyric lectures.”57 
The second method by which a court may assess the validity of an as-
serted tools-of-the-trade exemption is to determine whether the tool is an 
object that expands human capability.58 As a general matter, it seems safe 
to conclude that a business debtor’s automobile will not qualify as a tool of 
the trade, though it presumably would indeed expand his or her capability.59 
To confuse matters somewhat, the Bankruptcy Court for the Central District 
of Illinois has held that a cargo trailer would qualify for the exemption, 
                                                 
54 Id. at 766. 
55 11 U.S.C. § 522, for example, provides guidance, but not a definition, merely stating 
that “[t]he debtor’s aggregate interest, not to exceed $2,175 in value, in any implements, 
professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a dependent of the 
debtor.” Michigan also does not define the term, though it does list a number of examples. 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6023 (2011). 
56 William L. Norton, Jr., Tools of the Trade (Code § 522(d)(6)), 3 NORTON BANKR. L. 
& PRAC. § 56:18 (3d ed. Oct. 2011) [hereinafter Norton, Tools of the Trade] (citing In re 
Frierson, 15 B.R. 157 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981)); In re Quidley, 39 B.R. 362, 367 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. 1984); see In re Page, 131 B.R. 530, 531–32 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1991). 
57 In re Page, 131 B.R. at 532. 
58 See In re Hintz, 86 B.R. 571 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988) (Code § 522(f)(2)(B) [now 
Code § 522(f)(1)(B)(ii)] does not apply to capital assets); In re Eakes, 69 B.R. 497 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 1987); Norton, Tools of the Trade, supra note 56, § 56:18. 
59 See Thorpe Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Deitz, 429 N.Y.S.2d 386, 386 (Albany Cnty. Ct. 
1980) (“Certainly an automobile is ‘useful’ in any trade, to get to and from a job, but 
unless there is a special relationship between the automobile and the intrinsic nature of 
the job (other than general usefulness or convenience), such as a taxi to a cab driver, it is 
not a ‘necessary working tool’ within the intent and framework.”). 
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where debtors used the trailer to “haul food and cooking equipment for 
their catering business.”60 Not surprisingly, the Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Colorado has held that a truck driver may claim his commercial 
truck under the rubric of that state’s tools-of-the-trade exemption.61 
Among all the colorful litigation surrounding the exemption status of an 
automobile, one 2006 case in the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania stands alone. In In re Giles,62 the court allowed a debtor 
to exempt her 1995 Volvo 940 in order to travel from festival to festival to 
sell the hats she designed.63 A security guard’s firearm has been found not 
to qualify for the exemption,64 while the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 
District of Ohio was not entirely receptive to the legally inventive argument 
that a liquor license should qualify for the exemption.65 A computer, mean-
while, may qualify as a tool of the trade in a broader array of circumstances, 
such as when a lawyer who does not have clerks files for bankruptcy.66 
The litigation over what constitutes a tool of the trade seems to have 
no theoretical bounds. In one case, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western 
District of Kentucky (like Michigan, a Sixth Circuit jurisdiction) ruled that 
a table saw and a torch qualified for the exemptions, but that the debtor’s 
forklift and trailers did not.67 There, the steel fabricator debtor relied on 
the forklift and trailers “to move the sheet metal to, from and at job sites. 
The welder, table saw and torch [were] used to work the metal into proper 
form.”68 Another district within the Sixth Circuit refused to grant the exemp-
tion to a debtor employed as a truck driver who claimed a tractor trailer rig as 
                                                 
60 In re Hively, 358 B.R. 752, 752 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007). 
61 In re Van Winkle, 265 B.R. 247, 249 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2001). The United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio has also recently adopted such a rule. 
See In re Gaydos, 441 B.R. 102, 106–107 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010) (finding that “[t]he fact 
that there is an automobile exemption separate from the ‘tool of the trade’ exemption does 
not automatically preclude a motor vehicle from being a tool of the trade” (citing In re 
Rule, 38 B.R. 37, 41 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Adopting a 
comparatively permissive interpretation of Colorado’s exemption statute, that state’s bank-
ruptcy court has held that a nurse was entitled to exempt her 2004 Acura MDX, valued at 
$17,415, because the vehicle was “used and kept for the purpose of carrying on any gainful 
occupation.” In re Sackett, 394 B.R. 544, 550 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008). 
62 In re Giles, 340 B.R. 543 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006). 
63 Id. at 553. 
64 See In re Gregory, 246 F.3d 681 (10th Cir. 2000). 
65 In re Johnson, 255 B.R. 554, 555 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000). 
66 See In re Carson, 184 B.R. 587, 589 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1995). It should be noted 
that the lawyer’s filing of that case predates today’s prevalence of the Internet. How that 
may impact computer exemptions remains to be seen. 
67 In re Reed, 18 B.R. 1009, 1011 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982). 
68 Id. at 1009. 
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a tool of the trade,69 noting that “[t]he purpose of the tools-of-the-trade ex-
emption is to enable an artisan to retain tools of modest value so that he is not 
forced out of is trade.”70 Of course, some debtors are more ambitious than 
others. An Illinois debtor, seeking Chapter 7 protection and employed as a 
commodities trader, attempted to claim his seat on the Mid-American Ex-
change.71 Denying his petition, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois reasoned that the seat was an intangible item and that “[t]he 
purpose of the tools-of-the-trade exemption is to enable an artisan to retain 
tools of modest value so that he is not forced out of his trade.”72 
Two truisms perhaps account for the relative dearth of scholarly scru-
tiny devoted to tools-of-the-trade exemptions following the seismic pro-
creditor shift in bankruptcy law embodied by BAPCPA and In re Schafer. 
First, in this area of law, “[t]he major disputes center on farm equipment 
and animals, and motor vehicles.”73 Though critical and profitable for ob-
vious reasons, for the purposes of this Note, tools-of-the-trade exemptions 
that fall under this rubric will not be exhaustively examined. This is pri-
marily because such cases are generally filed under Chapter 12.74 The se-
cond reason is that, as mentioned, the value of these exemptions pales in 
comparison to that of homestead exemptions.75 This is not to say, howev-
er, that such exemptions are valueless, especially to a debtor facing liqui-
dation. In one case, for example, a debtor was willing to litigate the classi-
fication of a piano dolly in order to exempt its value.76 In another, a Texas 
bankruptcy court allowed a debtor to exempt boat molds, even though he 
had not been in the business of building boats for years.77 In a sluggish 
economy, the court’s reasoning is instructive. “Debtor testified that he is 
presently unable to build and sell boats, because there is no market. He 
testified that, if the market turns, he will be able to build and sell boats,” 
wrote an ultimately sympathetic court.78 Small business debtors should also 
                                                 
69 In re Nipper, 243 B.R. 33, 39 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1999). 
70 Id. at 38 (citing In re Patterson, 825 F.2d 1140, 1146 (7th Cir. 1987)). The court in In 
re Nipper again invokes the In re Patterson case when it writes, “to exempt a tractor, an 
expensive piece of machinery, was similar to exempting a debtor’s interest in an airplane 
used by an air charter service.” Id. (citing In re Patterson, 825 F.2d at 1147). 
71 In re Zais, 202 B.R. 263, 264 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996). 
72 Id. at 266 (citing In re Patterson, 825 F.2d at 1146) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
73 Norton, Tools of the Trade, supra note 56, § 56:18. 
74 See 11 U.S.C. § 1222(a)(2)(A) (2006) (addressing the disposition of “farm assets used 
in the debtor’s farming operation”). 
75 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2006). 
76 In re Winchester, 2007 WL 420391, at *1 (Bankr. D. Iowa 2007). 
77 In re Ferro, 2010 WL 310857, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010). 
78 Id. at *1. The court ruled in favor of granting the debtor the exemption he sought. Id. 
at *2 (“Balancing the Debtor’s uncontroverted testimony as to his continued focus on 
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take note of Mississippi’s recognition of restaurant equipment as tools-of-
the-trade.79 Given the financially volatile nature of the industry, this may 
make quite a difference to a debtor.80 
Though only an individual debtor may claim a tools-of-the-trade ex-
emption,81 an individual who owns or operates a small business may invoke 
substantially similar exemption laws.82 This certainly makes sense, as con-
ducting one’s business is why the tools-of-the-trade exemption is available 
in the first place.83 Of course, in order to qualify for the exemption, a debtor 
must prove he or she is still engaged in the business, the tools for which he 
or she claims the exemption.84 
IV. ANALYZING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
In 2009, the Fourth Circuit considered the constitutionality of West 
Virginia’s bankruptcy-only statute,85 much the same way the Sixth Circuit 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel had considered Michigan’s bankruptcy-only 
statute.86 West Virginia, unlike Michigan, has expressly opted out of the 
Bankruptcy Code.87 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit upheld West Virginia’s 
                                                                                                                         
building boats, even though the market does not presently support such activity ... the court 
concludes that the exemption for the boat molds should be allowed.”). 
79 In re Aurelio, 252 B.R. 102, 102 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2000). 
80 A security guard’s gun has been held not to qualify as tools of the trade. See In re 
Gregory, 246 F.3d 681, 681 (10th Cir. 2000). The same was held for a liquor license. In re 
Johnson, 255 B.R. 554, 554 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000). 
81 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (2006). 
82 See Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption Impairing Liens Under Bankruptcy Code Section 
522(f): One Step Forward and One Step Back, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 38 (1999) (“[M]ost 
small-business debtors are not terribly dissimilar by dint of their financial circumstances 
from the prototypical consumer debtor. This fuzzy line of demarcation corresponds with the 
similarly blurry distinction between consumer goods and tools of a debtor’s trade or profes-
sion, particularly in the case of self-employed individuals.”). 
83 See generally Craig Kendall, Bankruptcy: Debtor’s Tools of the Trade Are Defined by 
the “Use” Test, 30 WASHBURN L.J. 127 (1990). 
84 In re Ferro, 2010 WL 310857, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010) (“An item is an exempt 
tool of trade in Texas if the item is fairly belonging to or usable in the debtor’s trade, and 
used with sufficient regularity to indicate an actual use by the debtor.”) (citations omitted). 
85 Sheehan v. Peveich, 574 F.3d 248, 251 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1066 
(2010); W. VA. CODE § 38-10-4 (2011) (“Pursuant to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1), 
this state specifically does not authorize debtors who are domiciled in this state to exempt 
the property specified under the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).”). West Virginia’s tools-
of-the-trade exemption under that statute is $1500. Id. 
86 In re Schafer, 455 B.R. 590, 601 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2011). 
87 W. VA. CODE § 38-10-4 (2011) (“Pursuant to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1), 
this state specifically does not authorize debtors who are domiciled in this state to exempt the 
property specified under the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).”). This language neatly 
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exemption law.88 As outlined in footnote 2 of the Fourth Circuit opinion, 
many jurisdictions have also upheld states’ bankruptcy-only approaches,89 
though several others have invalidated such distinctions.90 The pivotal dif-
ference in these cases appears to be whether a state had expressly opted 
out of the Bankruptcy Code, as West Virginia had.91 Though a correlation 
seems clear, it is no guarantee that opting out will automatically substanti-
ate a state’s exemption scheme, at least in the eyes of the courts.92 Not 
surprisingly, though, jurisprudence on state exemptions does suggest that 
treating bankrupt debtors differently than debtors not in bankruptcy may 
lead to invalidation.93 Because states routinely distinguish between debt-
ors, this approach does not seem entirely consistent. 
As pointed out by an appellate amicus brief for the Sixth Circuit in In 
re Schafer, state exemption law habitually treats debtors with different 
characteristics in different fashions.94 For example, Hawaii and Michigan 
provide a larger homestead exemption to debtors older than sixty-five than 
those states provide to younger debtors.95 Moreover, the amount of a 
homestead exemption may vary, depending on why the debtor declared 
                                                                                                                         
complies with 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) (2006), which states, “[p]roperty listed in this paragraph 
is property that is specified under subsection (d), unless the State law that is applicable to the 
debtor under paragraph (3)(A) specifically does not so authorize.” The Michigan exemption 
statue, conversely, contained no such language. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5451 (2011). 
88 Sheehan, 574 F.3d at 252, cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1066 (2010). 
89 See id. at 252; In re Kulp, 949 F.2d 1106, 1106 (10th Cir. 1991); In re Brown, 2007 
WL 2120380 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 2007); In re Shumaker, 124 B.R. 820, 820 (Bankr. D. 
Mont. 1991); In re Vasko, 6 B.R. 317, 317 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980). 
90 See In re Kanter, 505 F.2d 228, 228 (9th Cir. 1974); In re Regevig, 389 B.R. 736, 736 
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 2008); In re Wallace, 347 B.R. 626, 626 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006); In re 
Cross, 255 B.R. 25, 25–26 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2000); In re Mata, 115 B.R. 288, 289 (Bankr. 
D. Colo. 1990); In re Lennen, 71 B.R. 80, 80 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987); In re Reynolds, 24 
B.R. 344, 344 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982). 
91 Colorado has opted out of the federal exemption list. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-54-
107 (1987); In re Kulp, 949 F.2d at 1107; In re Brown, 2007 WL 2120380 (“New York 
State has opted out of the exemptions available in Code § 522(d).”); In re Shumaker, 124 
B.R. at 824 (“Montana has opted-out of the federal exemptions allowed under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 522(d).”); In re Vasko, 6 B.R. at 318 (“The Ohio Legislature has ‘opted out’ of the federal 
exemption scheme set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).”). 
92 See In re Regevig, 389 B.R. at 736 (where California had opted out of exemption 
scheme but bankruptcy-only framework was still held unconstitutional). 
93 See, e.g., In re Wallace, 347 B.R. at 626 (dealing further with Michigan law). 
94 Brief Amici Curiae of the National Assoc. of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, et al. 
in Support of Debtor’s Position at 28, Michigan v. Richardson (In re Steven M. Schafer), 
2011 WL 2602908 (6th Cir. June 27, 2011) (Nos. 11-1340, 11-1387) [hereinafter Amicus 
Brief Supporting Debtor’s Position]. 
95 Id. (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 651-92; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 6000.5451(1)). 
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bankruptcy. Consider Louisiana, wherein a resident is entitled to an unlim-
ited homestead exemption “in the case of obligations arising directly as a 
result of a catastrophic or terminal illness or injury.”96 Normally, a Louisi-
anan may only claim a $35,000 homestead exemption.97 Because states are 
able to distinguish between different types of debtors, it stands to reason 
that states may have the authority to distinguish between bankrupt debtors 
and debtors who have not filed for bankruptcy. The In re Schafer appel-
lants took further issue with the distinction, drawn among bankrupt debt-
ors, made by Florida, Texas, and Kansas, which “set acreage limitations to 
their homestead exemptions that vary depending on the property location, 
differing by county or based upon urban versus rural distinctions.”98 So 
argued the appellants, and in fact they did so successfully.99 
V. WHAT STATES MUST DO 
Whether bankruptcy-only statutes are constitutional is beyond the scope 
of this Note,100 but how states must respond to courts’ interpretations of 
such statutes is very much within it. Clearly, opting out of the Bankruptcy 
Code has long been indispensable to validation in some jurisdictions, even 
prior to BAPCPA.101 In a decade fraught with seismic change in this area 
of law, the approach rooted in longstanding bankruptcy principals emerges 
as the soundest option for states aiming to protect their debtors. It would 
greatly behoove small business debtors for the states simply to opt out of 
the Bankruptcy Code, if they have not done so already. The sooner states 
fall in line, the better off those debtors will be. 
                                                 
96 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20:1 (2011). The statute goes on to define, “catastrophic or 
terminal illness or injury” as an “illness or injury which creates uninsured obligations to 
health care providers of more than ten thousand dollars and which are greater than fifty 
percent of the annual adjusted gross income of the debtor, as established by an average of 
federal income tax returns for the three preceding years.” Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Amicus Brief Supporting Debtor’s Position, supra note 94, at 11 (citing FLA. CONST. 
art. X, § 4; TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 51; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2301). 
99 The Sixth Circuit made specific mention of the Texas and Florida approach on ap-
peal. See In re Schafer, 689 F.3d 601, 615 (6th Cir. 2012). 
100 For commentary on the constitutionality of bankruptcy-only statutes, see, e.g., Rebecca 
B. Connelly, A Look at the Constitutionality of State “Bankruptcy-Only” Exemptions, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2010; Peter Spero, Exemptions in Bankruptcy—Validity of State 
Bankruptcy-Only Exemptions, FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS, PREBANKRUPTCY PLANNING AND 
EXEMPTIONS § 12:32 (Database Updated August 2011); Geeta Dharmappa, Exemptions and 
the Bankruptcy Code: Can States Opt Out of the Constitution?, J. BANKR. L. 2010, at 11–12. 
101 In re Lennen, 71 B.R. 80, 83 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987) (striking down as unconstitu-
tional California’s bankruptcy-only scheme). 
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Why did Michigan extend more generous protection to bankrupt debt-
ors, and why has Michigan not opted out by now? The self-evident answer 
is to provide a choice to its debtors. Considering the values of federal ex-
emptions and those of state exemptions, however, this choice seems rather 
illusory. It is virtually inarguable that Michigan’s commitment to upholding 
a debtor’s right to exempt his tools-of-the-trade is a remarkably longstanding 
one, spanning over a century and a half.102 At the very least, Michigan should 
probably be able to account for the discrepancy in its exemption laws when 
its lawmakers were likely aware of their suspect constitutionality, given the 
extensive case law on this relatively narrow issue.103 As it stands, Michigan 
allows bankrupt debtors to exempt “$3,000.00 in household goods, furniture, 
utensils, books, appliances, and jewelry.”104 Should a bankrupt small busi-
ness debtor in Michigan need to exempt an automobile, yet find that the au-
tomobile does not qualify for a tools-of-the-trade exemption, the value of 
that exemption would be $2775.105 If the same debtor sought his or her 
relief from the Bankruptcy Code, the value of his or her household good 
exemption would be $11,525 and the motor vehicle exemption would be 
$3450.106 Of course, the federal tools-of-the-trade protection is also more 
generous.107 When viewed in light of the similar disparity in the value of 
their relative homestead exemptions,108 why a Michigan debtor in bankrupt-
cy would choose to invoke state exemption law is somewhat unclear. Cer-
tainly, there are some benefits that Michiganders may claim thanks to their 
state legislators. Somehow, though, a $500 exemption for a “seat, pew, or slip 
occupied by the judgment debtor or the judgment debtor’s family in a house 
or place of public worship”109 does not seem sufficiently compensatory. 
                                                 
102 See, e.g., Smalley v. Masten, 8 Mich. 529, 529 (1860) (noting that “‘[t]he tools, im-
plements, materials, stock, apparatus, team, vehicle, horses, harness, or other things to 
enable any person to carry on the profession, trade, occupation or business, in which he is 
wholly or principally engaged, not exceeding in value two hundred and fifty dollars’ 
(Comp. L., § 4465), are exempt from levy and sale on execution”); Hutchinson v. Whitmore, 
90 Mich. 255 (1892); Morrill v. Seymour, 3 Mich. 64 (1853). 
103 See In re Hintz, 86 B.R. 571, 571 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988) (Code § 522(f)(2)(B) 
[now Code § 522(f)(1)(B)(ii)] does not apply to capital assets); In re Eakes, 69 B.R. 497 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987); Norton, Tools of the Trade, supra note 56. 
104 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5451 (2011). 
105 Id. Many debtors may prefer this exemption limit to that assigned to tools-of-the-
trade in Michigan, which is lower. Id. 
106 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2006). 
107 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6) (granting a $2175 tools-of-the-trade exemption); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 600.5451 (establishing a $2000 tools-of-the-trade exemption). 
108 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6027 (limiting Michigan’s home-
stead exemption to $3500). 
109 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5451. 
2013] WHEN OPTING OUT IS THE ONLY OPTION 761 
Because it is one of the relatively few states that has declined to expressly 
opt out of the bankruptcy code, Michigan became the battleground for this 
fundamental disagreement. Shortly before In re Schafer, the Bankruptcy 
Court for the Western District of Michigan, striking down Michigan’s bank-
ruptcy-specific exemptions as unconstitutional, observed, “[i]f § 600.5451 is 
constitutional, one obvious result is that creditors would be penalized for ex-
ercising their specific right granted by Congress to file an individual’s invol-
untary case. Bankruptcy specific exemptions might be an extreme disincen-
tive which would effectively hinder creditors’ rights.”110 Mere months later, 
the bankruptcy court reversed course by pointing out that 
any disparity between state exemptions and federal exemptions would 
create an incentive or disincentive for either creditors or debtors to seek 
relief under the Bankruptcy Code. This possibility is inherent in any 
legislative scheme, such as 11 U.S.C. § 522(b), that envisions a role for 
the states to play in enacting alternative exemptions, whether generally 
applicable or bankruptcy-specific.111 
The near chaotic discord this question has invited throughout Michigan 
bankruptcy courts alone should send an unmistakable signal to lawmakers 
in Lansing and elsewhere. 
The In re Schafer line of cases did not represent the only way in which 
Michigan stands at the forefront of emerging exemption issues. In In re 
Sassak,112 a Michigan debtor sought to invoke Michigan’s slate of state ex-
emptions113 because the debtor sought to exempt a particular set of life insur-
ance policies. The question before the court, however, was “whether a debtor 
who elects the state exemption scheme option set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3) 
can be limited to the exemptions specifically enumerated in MCL § 600.5451, 
                                                 
110 In re Pontius, 421 B.R. 814, 823 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2009). In essence, In re Pontius 
serves as a companion case to In re Schafer. In In re Pontius, as was the case in In re Schafer, 
a Chapter 7 debtor attempted to exempt her homestead by drawing on the provisions of 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5451(1)(n). Id. at 815. Unique to In re Pontius, however, is the 
bankruptcy court’s analysis of delegation. Id. at 819. The In re Pontius court held that in 
enacting § 600.5451, the Michigan Legislature attempted to write a portion of the 
Bankruptcy Code. Congress is constitutionally prohibited from delegating its “Bankruptcy 
Power” to any state, including Michigan. Id. at 820–21. The principle of non-delegation 
seemed to inform the court’s ruling in In re Schafer as well, wherein the court wrote, “[t]he 
Bankruptcy Clause exists to restrict the power of the states to legislate in the area of 
bankruptcy. A state law which applies only to debtors in bankruptcy must be analyzed 
under the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause.” In re Schafer, 455 B.R. 
590, 601 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2011). 
111 In re Jones, 428 B.R. 720, 728 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010). 
112 In re Sassak, 426 B.R. 680 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
113 Id. at 681. 
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which are available only to Michigan debtors in bankruptcy.”114 In In re Sassak, 
the debtor additionally aimed to receive “entitlement to other Michigan exemp-
tions historically available to both bankrupt and non-bankrupt debtors.”115 
“[T]he Michigan exemption scheme historically has included as allowa-
ble exemptions those available under other Michigan statutes, not a part of 
the general exemption statute, some of which specifically reference bankrupt-
cy proceedings and others which reference only creditors in general,” the 
court in In re Sassak explained.116 Because the court ultimately upheld this 
scheme,117 pro-debtor bankruptcy advocates may do well to consider incorpo-
rating tools-of-the-trade exemptions, among others more traditionally asso-
ciated with bankruptcy, into the set of exemptions that the debtor in In re 
Sassak was able to access. 
As it stands, the prospects of success on this front appear bleak. Unlike the 
specifically designated tools-of-the-trade exemption in MCL 600.5451(f), the 
life insurance policy at issue in In re Sassak was not identified by Michigan’s 
list of exemptions that make specific mention of the bankruptcy code.118 Thus, 
it appears Michigan lawmakers would need to draft an entirely distinct law ex-
empting tools-of-the-trade from the reach of creditors, independent of MCL 
600.5451, or argue that M.C.I.A. 600.6023119 serves an identical function. 
States that have not opted out would be wise to enact reform quickly, as 
judicial intervention, let alone comprehensive correction, appears unlikely. As 
the First Circuit once proclaimed, “[t]he state’s ability to define its exemp-
tions is not absolute and must yield to conflicting policies in the Bankrupt-
cy Code.”120 Evidently, many courts share this view.121 Though opting out 
                                                 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 683. 
117 In re Sassak, 426 B.R. at 695 (“Given the absence of express limiting language in the 
opening paragraph of MCL 600.5451 and the conflict which a finding of exclusivity would 
present with the broader mandate of 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3) ... this Court concludes that 
Appellee, who claims exemption pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3), is also entitled to claim 
an exemption under MCL 500.2207 for the value of his whole life policy.”). 
118 Id. at 687. 
119 This provision exempts up to $1000 from “levy and sale under any execution” for 
“the tools, materials, stock, apparatus, team, vehicle, motor vehicle, horses, harness, or 
other things to enable a person to carry on the profession, trade, occupation, or business in 
which the person is principally engaged.” The provision need not apply to bankrupt debtors. 
120 In re Weinstein, 164 F.3d 677, 683 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 
305, 313 (1991)); see also In re Cunningham, 513 F.3d 318, 323 (1st Cir. 2008); In re 
Garcia, 2010 WL 2697020, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010). 
121 See In re Kanter, 505 F.2d 228, 228 (9th Cir. 1974); In re Regevig, 389 B.R. 736, 736 
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 2008); In re Wallace, 347 B.R. 626, 626 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006); In re 
Cross, 255 B.R. 25, 25 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2000); In re Mata, 115 B.R. 288, 288 (Bankr. D. 
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of the Bankruptcy Code may not entirely ensure judicial approval,122 it un-
questionably bolsters its likelihood.123 
Waiting for any strain of judicial action, approval or otherwise, will ac-
complish little for states that presently offer their debtors a choice of laws. It 
may be true that “[a]ny case involving a circuit split is a potential target for 
Supreme Court review, even if it involves a mundane matter, because the 
inconsistency can be a problem in itself.”124 Still, the prospects of certiorari 
appear dim. 
Since In re Schafer, another Michigan court has weighed in on the 
same legal issues that the case presents for bankrupt debtors. In In re 
Reinhart,125 the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 
Southern Division, faced a factual scenario in which a Chapter 7 debtor 
sought to exempt property under MCL § 600.5451.126 The court in In re 
Reinhart ruled against this proposal, but declined to do so on constitution-
al grounds.127 Instead, wrote the court, “Congress ... did not intend[] 
§ 522(b)(3)(A) to allow debtors to claim exemptions under state bankrupt-
cy-specific exemption laws such as MCL § 600.5451.”128 The court 
framed the issue as whether Congress aimed “to allow a debtor to claim 
                                                                                                                         
Colo. 1990); In re Lennen, 71 B.R. 80, 80 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987); In re Reynolds, 24 B.R. 
344, 344 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); see also Weinstein, 164 F.3d at 677 (holding that the 
Bankruptcy Code preempted certain provisions of the Massachusetts Homestead Act). 
122 See In re Regevig, 389 B.R. at 736 (invalidating California’s bankruptcy-only law). 
The case was brought in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona because “[t]he 
Debtors are currently Arizona residents but apparently were not Arizona residents for all of 
the 730 days preceding the filing of this case.” Id. at 737. In re Regevig serves as an 
example of BAPCPA’s new residency restrictions at play. 
123 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-54-107 (1987); In re Kulp, 949 F.2d 1106, 1107 (10th Cir. 
1991); In re Brown, 2007 WL 2120380 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 2007); In re Shumaker, 124 B.R. 
820, 824 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1991); In re Vasko, 6 B.R. 317, 318 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980). 
124 Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth Cir-
cuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405, 431 (1998); see also Eric Hansford, Measuring 
the Effects of Specialization with Circuit Split Resolutions, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1145, 1176 
(2011) (citing ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 226 (8th ed. 2002) 
(“The Supreme Court often, but not necessarily, will grant certiorari where the decision 
of a federal court of appeals, as to which review is sought, is in direct conflict with a de-
cision of another court of appeals on the same matter of [law]. One of the prime purposes 
of the certiorari jurisdiction is to bring about uniformity of decisions on these matters 
among the federal courts of appeals. Hence a square and irreconcilable conflict of this 
nature ordinarily should be enough to secure review, assuming that the underlying question 
has substantial practical importance.”)). 
125 In re Reinhart, 460 B.R. 466 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011). 
126 Id. at 467. 
127 Id. at 466. 
128 Id. at 468. 
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exemptions only in property that is exempt under the state law from exe-
cution on a judgment.”129 Though it is perhaps encouraging that another 
Michigan court has rejected the In re Schafer line of reasoning, debtors 
may find little solace if the outcome is effectively the same. 
Early in 2010, the Supreme Court declined to hear the Sheehan v. 
Peveich appeal.130 Considering the breadth of the circuit split and the im-
portance of the issues cases in the Sheehan and In re Schafer mold present, 
this decision is every bit as surprising as it is disappointing. Though the Sixth 
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has heard and ruled on In re Schafer 
since that denial, if the Supreme Court was especially concerned with bank-
ruptcy uniformity, it likely would have granted certiorari to Sheehan. Because 
it has declined to do so, the assumption that it will not tackle the bankrupt-
cy-only exemption issue appears altogether wise.131 If Michigan would have 
liked to ensure its debtors had the most favorable series of exemptions pos-
sible, opting out of the Bankruptcy Code would have exhibited far greater 
attentiveness to those debtors’ needs. 
It would be defeatist and somewhat misguided for debtors to conclude 
that the outlook is entirely grim. Most importantly, the Sixth Circuit has re-
cently held that Michigan did indeed have the authority to provide a differ-
ent array of exemptions to bankrupt debtors.132 Moreover, New York up-
held the constitutionality of that state’s bankruptcy specific exemption 
scheme.133 When viewed in conjunction with the comparable ruling, courtesy 
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130 Connelly, supra note 100, at 14 (citing Sheehan v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 1066 (2010)). 
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131 The Supreme Court, however, has not been altogether silent recently on tools-of-
the-trade exemptions. See Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010). There, a caterer 
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than the full value of the property. Id. at 2652. It seems curious that the Court would 
grant certiorari to such a case due in large part to “a disagreement among the Courts of 
Appeals” but decline to hear In re Schafer or Sheehan on appeal. Id. at 2657. 
132 See In re Schafer, 689 F.3d 601, 607 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating that “an interpretation 
of § 522 that permits states to enact bankruptcy-specific exemptions schemes does not 
run afoul of either the Bankruptcy or Supremacy Clauses of the Constitution”). 
133 See In re Brown, 2007 WL 2120380 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 2007). 
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of the Fourth Circuit in Sheehan, the Supreme Court’s refusal to grant cer-
tiorari becomes even more baffling than before.134 BAPCPA was enacted 
in large measure to abate the exploitation of the Bankruptcy Code’s geo-
graphic idiosyncrasies.135 The current patchwork of bankruptcy legislation 
and jurisprudence throughout the nation, however, may well elicit the di-
rectly opposite effect. Indeed, if exemption law is more favorable to a 
debtor in New York than it is elsewhere, there would seem to be a strong 
incentive for an enterprising, yet risk-averse, small business owner to es-
tablish his or her business in New York or perhaps even to relocate there. 
The problem is that this situation is not borne of policy, but of interpreta-
tion. If the New York legislature aimed to encourage small business owners 
to relocate to New York, it is of course well within its right to offer a more 
enticing tax regimen than its neighbors offer.136 It is not, however, entitled to 
its own federal Constitution; no state is.137 The court’s reasoning in In re 
Brown appears persuasive when it concludes, citing age-old precedent, that “a 
federal bankruptcy law which recognizes and enforces state laws, affecting 
exemptions and priorities of payment is a uniform law, even though the law 
may operate differently from state to state.”138 
CONCLUSION 
Though In re Regevig stands for the proposition that opting out of the 
Bankruptcy Code and enacting a bankruptcy-only paradigm may not be 
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U.S. 181 (1903)). The crucial difference is that “Congress can give effect to the allowance 
of exemptions prescribed by state law without violating the uniformity requirement.” In re 
Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131, 1135 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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enough to rebut claims that the scheme is unconstitutional,139 and the Su-
preme Court has asserted that the state’s ability to define its exemptions is 
not absolute and must yield to conflicting policies in the Bankruptcy 
Code,140 the evidence is on balance far too overwhelming to ignore.141 If 
states aim to maximize the protection of their bankrupt debtors, which is the 
apparent justification for offering those debtors a choice between federal 
and state exemption law, opting out of the Bankruptcy Code appears to be 
the most viable avenue to accomplish that noble goal. 
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